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Introduction
We	(African	Centre	for	Biosafety	(ACB))	have	
been	requested	by	the	União	Nacional	de	
Camponeses	(UNAC)	to	provide	an	opinion	
on	Mozambique’s	Norms	on	the	Protection	
of	New	Plant	Varieties,	as	approved	by	
Decree	no.	58/2006	of	26th	December,	(year	
unknown)	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	PVP	
law).	This	PVP	law	was	ostensibly	approved	in	
terms	of	“current	developments	in	the	field	
of	plant	variety	protection,	and	pursuant	to	
subparagraph	(f)	of	paragraph	1	of	Article	204	
of	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic”.	We	were	
not	given	any	information	about	the	scope	
and	nature	of	the	public	consultation	that	is	
required	to	be	undertaken	by	the	government	
of	Mozambique	in	the	drafting	and	approval	
of	the	PVP	law	and	whether	any	such	public	
consultation	has	indeed	taken	place.	These	are	
issues	for	UNAC	to	explore	further.	
In	this	paper,	we	have	dealt	only	with	the	most	
important	provisions	of	the	Mozambique	PVP	
law	that	affect	small-scale	farmers.	The	ACB	
has	worked	from	the	version	of	the	PVP	law	
translated	from	Portuguese	by	translator,	Mr	
Dudu	Coelho	from	Mozambique.	
Summary 
Mozambique,	as	a	member	of	the	G8	New	
Alliance	on	Food	Security	and	Nutrition,	has	
undertaken	to	restructure	its	seed	system	
to	enable	the	production	and	distribution	of	
improved	seeds,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	
hybrid	seed,	in	efforts	to	increase	agricultural	
yields.
The	country	has	already	developed	a	set	of	
seed	laws	titled	Regulation On Seed Production, 
Marketing Quality Control And Certification	
(Ministerial	Order	No.	184/2001).	This	set	of	
seed	laws	creates	an	exclusive	seed	market	
for	certified,	improved,	commercial	varieties	
of	seed.	It	excludes	farmers’	varieties	from	
the	market,	as	it	makes	it	impossible	for	
these	varieties	to	be	officially	recognised	and	
registered.	
This	PVP	law	is	part	of	the	package	to	
restructure	Mozambique’s	seed	system	to	
provide	secure	markets	for	private	investment,	
including,	and	especially	through,	the	
protection	of	private	ownership	over	seed	in	
the	form	of	intellectual	property	protection,	
based	on	the	provisions	of	UPOV	1991	
(International	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	
New	Varieties	of	Plants	of	December	2,	1961,	as	
revised	at	Geneva	on	November	10,	1972,	and	
October	23,	1978).	
Mozambique	is	not	dissimilar	to	many	African	
countries;	desperate	for	investment	and	
financial	relief,	it	is	willing	to	make	whatever	
policy	changes	are	necessary	to	bring	capital	
into	the	country	on	the	terms	set	by	the	array	
of	actors	behind	the	Green	Revolution	push	
underway	in	Africa.		
The	architecture	of	Mozambique’s	PVP	
law	is	based	on	UPOV	1991	signalling	the	
government’s	support	and	promotion	of	a	
“Seed is the first link in the food chain and embodies millennia 
of evolution and thousands of years of farmers breeding as well as 
the culture of freely saving and sharing seed. It is the expression 
of earth’s intelligence and the intelligence of farming communities 
down the ages.” The Law of the Seed1
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particular	type	of	plant	breeding	system,	
namely	industrial	breeding	for	cultivation	
in	large-scale,	mono-cropping,	commercial	
farming	systems.	These	systems	are	heavily	
dependent	on	high	irrigation	and	synthetic	
fertiliser	and	pesticide	use.	There	is	no	evidence	
in	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	that	policymakers	
in	Mozambique	looked	at	sui generis	(of	its	own	
kind)	systems	from	developing	countries	for	
guidance.	Sui generis	systems	seek	to	include	
and	support	the	interests	of	all	affected	groups,	
including	farmers,	consumers,	indigenous	
communities	and	local	industries.	Indeed,	
Mozambique’s	PVP	has	pointedly	snubbed	
the	African	Model	Law.	This	is	all	the	more	
tragic,	as	Mozambique	is	classified	as	an	Least	
Developed	Country	(LDC)	and	is	not	obliged	to	
implement	its	obligations	in	terms	of	Article	
27.3(b)	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation’s	
(WTO)	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	
Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS)	agreement	
for	another	eight	years.	Article	27.3(b)	requires	
countries	to	provide	protection	for	plant	
varieties	through	an	effective	sui generis	
system.	
This	orientation	towards	industrial	breeding	
is	most	clearly	epitomised	in	the	requirement	
that	registration	of	a	plant	breeders’	right	will	
only	be	granted	if	a	variety	is	new,	distinct,	
uniform	and	stable	(NDUS).	This	requirement	
is	modelled	on	UPOV	1991.	These	criteria	
encourage	genetic	homogeneity	and	cannot	
be	used	to	protect	more	diverse	plant	varieties,	
traditional	varieties	or	cultivated	land	races.	
The	government	of	Mozambique	has	turned	
a	blind	eye	to	its	small-scale	farmers	and	their	
seed	and	farming	systems.	The	provisions	
dealing	with	the	exclusive	rights	granted	to	
plant	breeders’	and	the	exceptions	to	those	
rights	render	the	centuries-old	African	farmers’	
practices	of	freely	using,	exchanging	and	
selling	seeds/propagating	material	illegal.	
The	PVP	law	also	forbids	farmers	from	freely	
exchanging	or	selling	farm-saved	seed	and	
propagating	material	even	in	circumstances	
where	breeders’	interests	are	not	adversely	
affected,	for	example	in	small	amounts	or	
for	local	rural	trade.	This	must	be	fiercely	and	
urgently	resisted.	
Key agriculture issues at a glance
Mozambique,	known	as	Lourenco	Marques	
during	the	colonial	period,	has	a	population	
of	about	25	million	people.	Most	live	in	rural	
areas	and	most	rely	on	farming	for	all	or	
part	of	their	household	income.	Located	on	
Africa’s	southeastern	seaboard,	the	country	
encompasses	biodiversity	sites	of	great	
significance.	These	sites	include	the	Gorongosa	
Mountains,	the	Great	Inselberg	Archipelago	of	
Quirimbas	in	Northern	Mozambique,	and	the	
Chimanimani	Massif.	Mozambique	is	home	
to	around	5	500	plants,	581	birds,	and	205	
mammals,	according	to	national	estimates.2	
Portuguese	settlers	were	allocated	large	pieces	
of	land	during	the	colonial	period,	while	most	
of	the	working	population	engaged	in	manual	
labour.	Agricultural	production	was	focused	
on	increasing	the	supply	of	raw	materials	
to	Portugal.	In	the	two	years	following	
independence	in	1975	and	prior	to	the	outbreak	
of	civil	war	in	1977,	the	new	Mozambican	state	
concentrated	on	the	agricultural	sector	making	
provision	for	inputs,	controlling	prices	and	
setting	up	marketing	channels.	The	civil	war	
lasted	from	1977	to	1992	and	nearly	devastated	
the	agricultural	sector.	Floods	in	1977	and	
1978	and	a	three-year	drought	in	1980	almost	
brought	the	sector	to	collapse.	The	country	
became	almost	entirely	dependent	on	external	
aid	for	food	and	inputs.	At	the	end	of	the	
war,	donor	money	flowing	into	Mozambique	
was	contingent	on	the	government	putting	
structural	adjustment	policies	in	place	and	
liberalising	the	sector.3
Today	agriculture	is	said	to	account	for	25%	of	
Mozambique’s	gross	domestic	product	(GDP)	
and	the	sector	employs	80%	of	its	workforce.	
Of	the	agricultural	workforce,	60%	are	female.4	
Cassava,	sugarcane	and	maize	are	the	major	
crops	cultivated	in	the	country	(see	table	
below).	Average	grain	yields	in	2010	were	less	
than	1	ton	per	hectare	(ha).	According	to	the	
Alliance	for	a	Green	Revolution	in	Africa	(AGRA),	
Mozambique	has	49.4	million	ha	of	agricultural	
land	(annual,	perennial	and	pasture),	5.4	million	
ha	of	which	was	cultivated	in	2011.5	AGRA	
estimates	that	the	adoption	rate	for	“improved”	
maize	seed	is	11%	and	that,	between	2005	
and	2008,	only	4–5%	of	small-scale	farmers	
used	fertiliser	with	the	bulk	of	fertiliser	use	
(90%)	accounted	for	by	tobacco	and	sugarcane	
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cultivation.6	Spending	on	agricultural	research	
is	low	compared	to	continental	averages.	
In	2008,	Mozambique	had	11.8	agricultural	
research	staff	per	million	people	in	contrast	
to	the	sub-Saharan	Africa	(SSA)	average	of	
23.4	and	public	spending	on	research	and	
development	(R&D)	as	a	percentage	of	
agricultural	GDP	was	0.4%	compared	to	the	
SSA	average	0.9%.
Major crops cultivated in Mozambique in 
2013
Crop Production (tons)
Cassava 10	051	364
Sugarcane	 3	393	904
Maize 1	177	390
Sweet	potato 900	000
Pulses 602	406
Bananas 470	000
Rice 280	000
Sorghum 239	000
Potatoes	 205	000
Groundnuts 112	913
Mozambique	is	seen	as	a	high	potential	
agricultural	country.	Consequently,	AGRA,	
Feed	the	Future	(a	USAID	initiative)	and	Grow	
Africa	(a	joint	African	Union	(AU)	Commission,	
New	Partnership	for	Africa’s	Development	
(NEPAD)	and	World	Economic	Forum	Initiative)	
are	all	active	in	the	country.	Mozambique’s	
Comprehensive	Africa	Agricultural	
Development	Programme	(CAADP)	National	
Investment	Plan	for	Agriculture	and	CAADP	
National	Investment	Plan	for	Agriculture	and	
Food	Security	(PNISA)	and	the	Strategic	Plan	
for	Development	of	the	Agricultural	Sector	
(PESDA)	guide	these	initiatives.	Mozambique	
is	a	G8	New	Alliance	member	country.	By	2013,	
17	companies	had	signed	‘Letters	of	Intent’	
through	Grow	Africa,	including	the	African	
Cashew	Initiative,	AGCO	(tractors,	machinery),	
Cargill	and	SAB	Miller.
Key	policy	commitments	under	Mozambique’s	
G8	Co-operation	Framework	include	crafting	
policies	and	regulations	for	input	markets,	
reforming	the	land	tenure	system,	promoting	
liberalisation	of	agricultural	trade,	increasing	
access	to	credit	and	implementing	a	national	
plan	on	nutrition.	
Members	of	the	G8	have	stressed	the	
importance	of	concentrating	on	the	Beira,	
Nacala	and	Zambezi	Valley	agricultural	
corridors	in	the	country.7	The	corridors	will	each	
focus	on	a	particular	commodity.	Beira	will	
focus	on	sugarcane,	fruit,	potatoes,	livestock,	
rice,	horticulture,	poultry	and	soya;	Nacala	will	
focus	on	banana,	vegetables,	grains,	soybeans,	
sesame,	tea,	groundnuts,	cotton	and	livestock;	
and	the	Zambezi	Valley	on	cotton,	maize,	rice	
and	soybeans.8
Despite	these	formal	interventions,	
Mozambique’s	seed	sector	remains	
characterised	by	a	farmer-saved	seed	system,	
which	serves	over	70%	of	farmers	and	informal	
exchange,	which	contributes	20%	to	the	seed	
sector.9	Seed	in	Africa	is	still	primarily	produced	
and	disseminated	through	“informal”	seed	
systems,10	that	is,	through	on-farm	seed	saving	
and	unregulated	distribution	between	farmers.	
This	system	has	survived	for	centuries	and	has	
generated	a	wide	diversity	of	seed	adapted	to	
local	agroecological	conditions.
The	formal	seed	sector	in	Mozambique	is	
relatively	small	in	comparison	and	comprises	
not	more	than	10%	of	the	seed	sector,	which	
is	concentrated	in	the	horticulture	sector	
and,	to	some	extent,	the	maize	sector.11	The	
farmer-saved	and	community-based	informal	
seed	systems	are	of	most	relevance	for	crops	
for	food	security,	for	example	the	traditional	
cereals	and	food	legumes.	They	are	also	most	
relevant	for	vegetatively	propagated	crops	such	
as	cassava	and	sweet	potato.12
Restructuring seed laws
Mozambique,	as	a	member	of	the	G8	New	
Alliance	on	Food	Security	and	Nutrition	
and	in	terms	of	Annex	1	of	the	Cooperation	
Framework,13	has	undertaken	to	restructure	
its	seed	system	to	enable	the	production	and	
distribution	of	improved	seeds	as	part	of	the	
objective	of	increasing	agricultural	yields,	
with	an	emphasis	on	hybrid	seeds.	Already	
the	country	has	developed	a	set	of	seed	laws	
titled	Regulation On Seed Production, Marketing 
Quality Control And Certification	(Ministerial	
Order	No.	184/2001.14
http://africagreenmedia.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/African-farmer.jpg
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Donors	and	potential	investors	have	identified	
weak	governance	and	regulatory	systems	and	
institutions	in	Africa	as	immediate	obstacles	to	
the	expansion	of	seed	systems	that	are	based	
on	quality	controls	and	intellectual	property.	
A	key	priority	in	the	commercial	agenda	is	to	
facilitate	regional	harmonisation	of	policies	
and	laws	to	regulate	and	support	investment	
in	seed	and	agrochemicals.	Towards	the	end	
of	2012,	the	ACB	published	a	report	titled	
“Harmonisation of Africa’s seeds laws: a recipe 
for disaster – Players, motives and dynamics”15	
showing	how	African	governments	are	being	
co-opted	into	reviewing	their	seed	laws	and	
supporting	the	implementation	of	PVP	laws	
through	fast-tracked	regional	harmonisation	
processes	and	trading	blocs.	The	government	
of	Mozambique	has	actively	participated	in	
two	regional	harmonisation	processes	with	
regard	to	draft	PVP	protocols	developed	
under	the	auspices	of	the	African	Regional	
Intellectual	Property	Organisation	(ARIPO)	(the	
Legal	Framework	for	the	Protection	of	New	
Varieties	of	Plants)	and	the	Southern	African	
Development	Community	(SADC)	(the	Protocol	
for	the	Protection	of	New	Varieties	of	Plants	
(Plant	Breeders’	Rights)	in	Southern	African	
Community	Development	Region).	As	is	evident	
from	the	discussion	below,	Mozambique’s	PVP	
law	has	been	heavily	influenced	and	informed	
by	the	draft	SADC	PVP	Protocol.	
Harmonisation	of	PVP	law	efforts	aim	to	
provide	secure	markets	for	private	investment	
including	and	especially	through	the	protection	
of	private	ownership	over	seed	in	the	form	of	
intellectual	property	protection,	based	on	the	
provisions	of	UPOV	1991.	Mozambique,	not	
dissimilar	to	many	African	countries,	desperate	
for	investment	and	financial	relief,	is	willing	to	
make	whatever	policy	changes	are	necessary	to	
bring	capital	into	the	country	on	the	terms	set	
by	the	array	of	actors	behind	the	bigger	Green	
Revolution	push	in	Africa.	These	actors	range	
from	multinational	corporations,	non-African	
states,	philanthropic	institutions,	multilateral	
institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank,	the	African	
seed	companies	and	even	non-government	
organisations.	
The	often-repeated	mantra	in	various	regional	
and	national	stakeholder	workshops	by	
policymakers	is	“harmonisation,	free	trade	
and	protection	of	private	intellectual	property	
rights	or	no	investment”.	Yet,	a	2005	World	
Bank	study	of	five	developing	countries	(China,	
Colombia,	India,	Kenya	and	Uganda)	found	no	
empirical	evidence	that	plant	breeders’	rights	
would	induce	new	research,	new	varieties	or	
strengthen	developing	country	seed	industries,	
thereby	questioning	the	value	of	PVP	regimes	
in	developing	countries.16Indeed,	the	authors	
concluded	that	in	developing	countries	where	
formal	seed	systems	are	just	emerging,	the	
efficient	and	transparent	management	
of	regulations	for	seed	marketing,	variety	
registration,	and	seed	certification	and	
quality	control	could	do	more	to	encourage	
commercial	seed	development	than	the	
establishment	of	PVP.17
Mozambique and International Treaty 
Obligations
Mozambique	ratified	the	Convention	on	
Biological	Diversity	in	1995	and	is	a	Party	to	
the	Cartagena	Protocol	on	Biosafety,	but	it	is	
not	a	Contracting	Party	to	the	International	
Treaty	on	Plant	Genetic	Resources	for	Food	and	
Agriculture	(ITPGRFA)18.	Mozambique	is	also	not	
a	member	of	either	UPOV	1978	or	UPOV	1991.
Mozambique	is	a	member	of	the	WTO	and	is	
recognised	by	the	organisation	as	a	LDC.19	It	
is	important	to	note	that	LDCs	are	given	an	
extended	transition	period	of	eight	years	to	
put	in	place	the	intellectual	property	rights	
systems	required	by	Article	27.3(b)	of	the	WTO’s	
TRIPS	agreement.	This	is	in	recognition	of	the	
special	requirements	of	LDCs,	their	economic,	
financial	and	administrative	constraints,	and	
the	need	for	flexibility	so	that	they	can	create	
a	viable	technological	basis.	20	There	is	thus	no	
international	legal	obligation	on	Mozambique	
for	at	least	another	7	years	to	“provide	
protection	for	plant	varieties	either	through	
patent	protection	either	through	patent	
protection	or	an	effective	sui generis	system	or	
a	combination	of	the	two.”21
Mozambique’s PVP Law – what kind of 
“effective sui generis system?”
Leaving	aside	for	the	moment	the	fact	that	
Mozambique	as	an	LDC	is	not	currently	obliged	
to	implement	the	provisions	of	27.3(b)	and	
assuming	that	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	
represents	“an	effective	sui generis	system”	
as	set	out	in	Article	27.3(b)	(in	the	view	of	
policymakers	in	Mozambique),	then	one	
has	to	ask	what	kind	of	effective	sui generis	
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system	has	been	put	in	place.	Sui generis	
refers	to	“of	its	own	kind”	or	“unique.”	It	is	
worth	noting	that	TRIPS	does	not	define	what	
a	sui generis	system	entails,	which	means	
that	WTO	member	states	have	flexibility	in	
crafting	such	an	effective	sui generis	system,	
including	one	that	arguably	does	not	have	
to	be	an	intellectual property rights	regime.	
However,	there	is	a	strong	prevailing	view	
that	Article	27.3(b)	requires	meeting	minimum	
requirements,	which	might	be	inferred	to	
include	that	it	should	confer	a	property	right,	
which	can	be	protected.22
It	has	been	argued	that	where	a	PVP	regime	
is	established,	WTO	member	states	have	
sufficient	flexibility	to	seek	a	balanced	
approach,	one	that	includes	and	supports	
the	interests	of	all	affected	groups	including	
farmers,	consumers,	indigenous	communities	
and	local	industries,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	
obligations	which	Mozambique	has	committed	
to	through	various	international	treaties	
should	be	of	benefit	to	all.23	
It	is	our	view	that	the	architecture	of	
Mozambique’s	PVP	law	is	based	principally	
on	that	of	UPOV	1991.	To	this	extent,	it	is	our	
respectful	view	that	Mozambique’s	PVP	law	
has	not	adopted	an	approach	that	seeks	to	
balance	the	proprietary	rights	granted	to	
commercial	plant	breeders	and	the	rights	of	
farmers	and	the	importance	of	biodiversity	
conservation	and	food	security.	
The	Alliance	for	Food	Sovereignty	in	Africa	
(AFSA)	argues	that	UPOV	1991	is	a	restrictive	
and	inflexible	legal	regime	that	grants	
extremely	strong	intellectual	property	rights	to	
commercial	breeders	and	undermines	farmers’	
rights.	Indeed	AFSA	is	of	the	view	that	African	
seed	laws	based	on	UPOV	1991	will	likely	
increase	seed	imports,	reduce	breeding	activity	
at	the	national	level,	facilitate	monopolisation	
by	foreign	companies	of	local	seed	systems,	
and	disrupt	traditional	farming	systems	upon	
which	millions	of	African	farmers	and	their	
families	depend	for	their	survival.24	
The	government	of	Mozambique	appears	
to	have	turned	a	blind	eye	to	the	enormous	
role	that	the	diversity	of	animal	and	plant	
kingdoms,	species	and	gene	pools	play	in	the	
productivity	of	farming	systems	in	a	range	
of	growing	conditions.	There	is	increasing	
consensus	that	diverse	farming	systems	
are	generally	more	resilient	in	the	face	of	
climate	change	and	they	enhance	food	
security.	Diversity	of	plant	life	can	maintain	
and	increase	soil	fertility	and	mitigate	the	
impact	of	pests	and	diseases.	Diversity	of	diet,	
founded	on	diverse	farming	systems,	delivers	
better	nutrition	and	greater	health,	with	
additional	benefits	for	human	productivity	and	
livelihoods.25
This	is	all	the	more	tragic	when	one	considers	
that	WTO	member	states	do	not	need	to	adopt	
the	protection	required	by	both	the	UPOV	Acts	
(UPOV	1978	and	1991)	for	compliance	with	the	
requirement	for	an	“effective	sui generis”	of	the	
TRIPS	Agreement.	This	is	because	Article	27.3(b)	
does	not	require	plant	variety	protection	laws	
to	contain	the	same	subject	matter,	eligibility	
requirements,	exclusive	rights,	terms	of	
protection	or	other	detailed	provisions	of	either	
the	two	UPOV	Acts.26	Indeed,	the	WTO	does	
not	require	any	member	state	to	join	the	UPOV	
system	at	all!
The	various	key	provisions	of	the	Mozambique	
PVP	law,	which	are	based	on	UPOV	1991,	that	
are	concerning	include	the	following:
•	 Chapter	II	dealing	with	the	conditions	for	
granting	plant	breeders’	rights,	read	together	
with	the	definitions	set	out	in	Article	1	of	the	
PVP	law	with	regard	to	the	NDUS	criteria.
•	 Chapter	V	dealing	with	the	plant	breeders’	
rights,	in	particular	the	provisions	relating	
to	the	scope	of	protection	of	plant	breeders’	
rights	in	Article	27	and	the	exceptions	to	the	
plant	breeder’s	rights	as	set	out	in	Article	28.	
The	key	provisions	in	these	chapters	are	dealt	
with	in	detail	below.	
Overview of Key 
Provisions
Objectives and Scope (Articles 2 and 3)
The	objective	of	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	is	
to	establish	rules	for	the	protection	of	new	
plant	varieties	(Article	2).	The	main	aim	of	a	sui 
generis	PVP	law	must	be	to	create	a	balance	
between	the	interests	of	commercial	breeders	
–	those	that	develop	new	varieties	–	and	to	
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uphold	practices	of	local	breeders,	mainly	
farmers	engaged	in	ongoing	cultivation	of	
“domestic”	varieties,	while	at	the	same	time,	
accommodating	new	varieties	that	farmers	
may	develop.27	
By	contrast,	the	Thai	PVP28	law	deals	with	
different	categories	of	varieties:	new	varieties,	
domestic	and	wild	varieties,	and	local	varieties,	
so	as	to	accord	differential	protection	to	
different	categories.	The	Thai	PVP	law	does	not	
accord	exclusive	protection	to	all	varieties,	but	
rather	seeks	to	provide	incentives	to	breeders	
of	domestic	farmers’	varieties.	For	general	
domestic	and	wild	varieties,	the	Thai	PVP	Act	
(Chapter	5)	details	access	and	benefit	sharing	
(ABS)	rules	and	gives	more	specific	protection	
rights	for	registered	local	community	varieties	
(Chapter	4).	The	community	would	then	receive	
exclusive	rights	to	conserve,	use,	research,	sell,	
and	commercialise	if	so	desired,	similarly	to	
new	plant	variety	rights.	29The	Mozambique	
PVP	law	does	not	entertain	any	differential	
protection	for	variety	protection	at	all.
Article	3	of	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	states	
that	the	law	is	to	apply	to	all	genera	and	
species	of	plant	varieties.	This	provision	is	
consistent	with	Article	2	of	the	draft	ARIPO	
Legal	Framework	for	the	Protection	of	New	
Varieties	of	Plants	and	Article	3(1)	of	the	draft	
SADC	PVP	Protocol.	
It	would	have	been	prudent	for	Mozambique	
to	limit	the	Act’s	application	within	a	particular	
genus	or	species	and	thereby	exclude	certain	
species	from	commercialisation	to	ensure	food	
security,	conserve	agricultural	biodiversity	and	
limit	the	type	of	plant	breeding,	manner	of	
reproduction	or	multiplication,	or	certain	end	
uses,	in	the	public	interest	(for	example,	genetic	
modification,	synthetic	biology,	terminator	
technology	and	so	forth).	It	is	interesting	
to	note	that	the	provisions	of	Article	3	go	
beyond	that	which	is	required	even	by	UPOV	
1991.	Article	3(2)	of	UPOV	requires	States	to	
protect	at	least	15	plant	genera	or	species	
upon	ratifying	the	UPOV	1991	Act	(which	
Mozambique	has	not	done)	and	to	extend	
protection	to	all	plant	varieties	within	10	years.	
Chapter II of the Mozambique PVP law 
(read together with definitions in  
Article 1)
Criteria for protection
The	PVP	law	promotes	and	protects	only	
one	type	of	plant/seed	breeding,	namely	
industrial	breeding	for	cultivation	in	large-
scale,	mono-cropping,	commercialised	farming	
systems,	heavily	reliant	on	high	irrigation,	
synthetic	fertiliser	and	pesticide	use.	Implicit	
in	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	is	the	view	that	
agricultural	biodiversity	is	valued	only	as	a	
source	of	traits	that	can	be	used	in	scientific	
breeding	programmes	to	improve	the	
productivity	of	crop	varieties.	See	for	example	
in	this	regard,	the	definition	of	“variety”	in	
Article	1.30	The	emphasis	is	on	the	expression	
of	characteristics	arising	from	the	genotype	
-	the	genetic	make-up	of	the	variety,	and	its	
protection	rather	than	on	observable	physical	
or	biochemical	aspects	of	the	variety.	This	
implicitly	renders	the	orientation	of	the	law	
towards	industrial	breeders	that	engage	in	
plant	breeding.	This	definition	in	Article	1	of	
the	Mozambique	PVP	law	is	identical	to	the	
definition	in	Article	1(vi)	of	UPOV	1991.
This	orientation	towards	industrial	breeding	
is	further	epitomised	by	the	provisions	set	out	
in	Chapter	II	of	the	PVP	law	dealing	with	the	
conditions	for	granting	plant	breeder’s	rights.	
These	provisions	clearly	state	in	Article	7	that	
plant	breeder’s	rights	will	be	granted	only	
when	a	variety	is	NDUS.	These	NDUS	criteria	
are	based	on	UPOV	1991.	Civil	society	groups	
have	criticised	these	criteria	as	encouraging	
genetic	homogeneity	and	as	being	unable	to	
protect	more	diverse	plant	varieties,	traditional	
varieties	or	cultivated	landraces	for	various	
reasons	more	fully	discussed	below.31	
The	Malaysian	PVP	law32	by	contrast,	grants	
a	breeder’s	right	if	the	plant	variety	is	NDUS	
to	cater	for	commercial	breeders,	but	then	
provides	that	where	a	plant	variety	has	been	
bred,	discovered	and	developed	by	a	farmers,	
local	community	or	indigenous	people,	a	
breeder’s	right	is	awarded	if	the	plant	variety	
is	new,	distinct,	and	identifiable.i	This	is	done	
i.	 Identificable	is	defined	in	section	14	of	Malaysia’s	PVP	law	as	follows:	a	plant	variety	is	identifiable	if	–
(i)	it	can	be	distinguished	from	any	other	plant	grouping	by	the	expression	of	one	characteristic	and	that	characteristic	is	
identifiable	within	individual	plants	or	within	and	across	a	group	of	plants;	and
(ii)	such	characteristics	can	be	identified	by	any	person	skilled	in	the	relevant	art.
10   A F R I C A N  C E N T R E  F O R  B I O S A F E T Y
to	accommodate	small-scale	breeders	seeking	
protection	for	their	varieties.	In	this	regard,	the	
criteria	for	protection	have	been	distinguished	
instead	of	the	varieties.	
There	is	no	evidence	in	the	Mozambique	PVP	
law	that	it	looked	to	sui generis	systems	from	
developing	countries	for	guidance.	There	is	only	
evidence	of	a	slavish	adoption	of	the	provisions	
of	UPOV	1991.	
When will a variety be considered to be new?
A	variety	is	deemed	new	if	it	satisfies	the	
novelty criteria	set	out	in	Article	8	of	the	
Mozambique	PVP	law.	
Novelty	in	Article	8(1)	of	the	Mozambique	
PVP	law	is	identical	to	the	novelty	criteria	
set	out	in	UPOV	1991,	as	well	as	Article	8(1)	
of	the	draft	SADC	PVP	Protocol	that	define	
novelty	in	terms	of	whether	a	variety	has	
been	previously	sold	or	disposed	off,	without	
the	consent	of	the	breeder.	As	in	the	case	of	
the	SADC	PVP	Protocol	provisions,	the	variety	
under	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	is	considered	
novel	if	the	variety	has	not	been	sold/disposed	
off	in	the	SADC	region	earlier	than	one	year	
before	the	date	of	application;	and	outside	of	
the	SADC	region	earlier	than	four	years	and	
six	years	for	trees	and	vines.	It	must	be	noted	
that	the	concept	of	“common	knowledge”	is	
not	referred	to	in	Article	8	of	the	Mozambique	
PVP	law,	but	rather	this	concept	is	dealt	with	
in	Article	9	dealing	with	distinctness.	Novelty	
is	one	of	the	criteria	for	patentability	in	any	
examination	as	to	substance.		An	invention	is	
new	if	it	is	not	anticipated	by	prior	art.	Prior	
art	is	in	general,	all	the	knowledge	that	existed	
prior	to	the	relevant	filing	or	priority	date	of	a	
patent	application,	whether	it	existed	by	way	
of	written	and	oral	disclosure.		
How is distinctness determined?
Mozambique	PVP	law	Article	9	sets	out	the	
criteria	for	distinctness.	A	variety	is	considered	
distinct	if	it	is	clearly	distinguishable	from	
any	other	variety	whose	existence	is	common 
knowledge	at	the	effective	date	of	application.	
This	wording	is	taken	verbatim	from	Article	7	of	
UPOV	1991.	
The	determination	of	the	existence	of	a	variety	
of	common	knowledge	is	to	be	tested	against	
the	factors	set	out	in	Article	9(2)(a)-(g)	of	the	
Mozambique	PVP	law	(read	together	with	
section	1	of	the	definitions.)	However,	Article	
9	is	silent	on	where	such	common	knowledge	
needs	to	exist	–	in	Mozambique,	the	SADC	
region	or	the	entire	world.	One	of	the	factors	
considered	is	the	“inclusion	of	the	variety	in	
a	collection	of	varieties	of	plants	accessible	
to	the	public”.	This	seems	to	refer	to	gene	
banks,	however,	it	should	refer	to	all	gene	
banks	in	the	world,	including	unimproved	
germplasm	already	in	the	public	domain,	such	
as	those	found	in	the	Consultative	Group	on	
International	Agricultural	Research	(CGIAR)	
seed	collections.	
Another	factor	is	the	“existence	of	a	precise	
description	of	the	variety	in	any	professional	
publication”.	A	similar	provision	is	to	be	found	
in	Article	9	of	the	draft	SADV	PVP	Protocol.	
Comments	made	by	civil	society	point	out	that	
the	wording,	“any	professional	publication”,	
is	too	restrictive	and	that	the	provision	
should	apply	to	“all	publications”.33	The	main	
concern	being	to	avoid	a	situation	in	which	
a	commercial	entity	seeks	to	obtain	plant	
variety	protection	over	biological	resources,	
including	plant	varieties	that	belong	to	or	are	
under	the	control	of	farmers	and	indigenous	
communities.	A	recent	example	of	such	
misappropriation	through	the	“shopping	for	
intellectual	property	at	farmers’	markets”	is	the	
“Turkey	Purple	Carrot”	case	where	Monsanto’s	
subsidiary	Seminis	purchased	farmers’	seed	in	
southern	Turkey	of	a	certain	variety	of	purple	
carrot	and	after	a	simple	process	of	selection,	
obtained	plant	variety	protection	in	both	the	
United	States	and	the	European	Union.34	
Article	9(2)(g)	provides	an	opening	for	the	list	
of	factors	against	which	distinctness	is	tested	
to	be	expanded	by	the	Registration	Entity,	an	
opportunity	that	should	be	fully	utilised	by	
UNAC	to	seek	protection	for	farmers’	varieties	
against	misappropriation	including	protection	
of	unimproved	or	wild	germplasm	found	in	
CGIAR	seed	collections.	(see	discussion	below	
on	disclosure).
How is uniformity determined?
Article	10	of	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	deals	
with	uniformity	and	provides	that	“a	variety	
is	deemed	to	be	uniform	if,	subject	to	the	
variation	that	may	be	expected	from	the	
particular	characteristics	of	its	propagation,	
it	is	sufficiently	uniform	in	its	principal	
characteristics”.	
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This	criterion	is	the	most	blatant	expression	of	
support	for	genetic	uniformity	by	the	reward	of	
a	plant	breeder’s	right	to	breeders	of	uniform,	
homogenous	plant	varieties	rather	than	
rewarding	breeders	who	cultivate	landraces	
that	exhibit	diverse	traits.	Such	a	provision	has	
the	effect	of	actively	discouraging	variability	
in	plant	varieties.	This	diversity	is	absolutely	
necessary	to	ensure	food	security.
How is stability determined?
In	terms	of	Article	11	of	the	Mozambique	
PVP	law,	a	variety	shall	be	deemed	to	be	
stable	if	its	principal	characteristics	do	not	
change	over	a	number	of	generations,	taking	
into	account	the	seed	chain	and	seedling	
production	system.	This	wording	is	a	little	
different	to	the	stability	criterion	in	Article	9	
of	UPOV	1991	and	Article	11	of	the	draft	SADC	
PVP	Protocol,	which	are	identical	to	each	other:	
“a	variety	shall	be	considered	to	be	stable	if	
its	relevant	characteristics	remain	unchanged	
after	repeated	propagation	or,	in	the	case	of	
a	particular	cycle	of	propagation,	at	the	end	
of	each	cycle”.	Nevertheless,	Article	11	of	the	
Mozambique	PVP	law	is	consistent	with	the	
UPOV	and	SADC	formulations	as	it	conveys	the	
consistent	and	central	message	that	a	breeder	
has	to	show	that	the	essential	characteristics	
of	its	variety	are	homogenous	or	uniform	
over	time,	even	after	repeated	reproduction	
or	propagation.	Hence,	the	same	criticisms	
that	apply	to	the	uniformity	criteria	apply	to	
the	stability	criteria,	as	regards	it	precluding	
the	protection	of	cultivated	landraces	and	
other	traditional	plant	varieties	inasmuch	as	
such	varieties	are	inherently	unstable	and	in	
permanent	evolution	and	adaptation.	
UNAC	should	seek	amendment	of	the	PVP	law	
by	arguing	in	favour	of	a	less	strict	criterion	
to	be	adopted	namely,	”identifiability”	instead	
of	the	UPOV	1991	style	”uniformity”	and	
“stability”.	Identifiability	would	allow	for	the	
inclusion	of	plant	populations	that	are	more	
heterogeneous,	and	thus	would	take	into	
account	the	interests	of	farmer	breeders,	as	
well	as	serve	as	an	incentive	to	all	breeders	to	
bring	more	genetically	diverse	varieties	to	the	
market.	
Chapter III-Application for plant 
breeders’ rights
No exceptions to the eligibility for breeders’ 
protection
An	application	for	plant	breeders’	rights	will	be	
granted	when	the	conditions	set	out	in	Chapter	
II	discussed	above	have	been	satisfied	(the	
meeting	of	the	NDUS	criteria).	Implicit	in	the	
law	is	that	the	applicant	will	bear	the	burden	
of	proving	that	the	variety	in	respect	of	which	
a	plant	breeder’s	right	is	being	sought,	satisfies	
the	NDUS	and	other	procedural	requirements	
of	the	law.	(See	also	in	this	regard	Article	25	and	
the	discussion	below	with	regard	to	pre-grant	
objections.)	
It	must	be	noted	that	Article	7(2)	provides	
that	the	granting	of	plant	breeders’	rights	
shall	not	be	subject	to	any	additional	criteria,	
provided	that	the	applicant	complies	with	the	
formalities	imposed	in	terms	of	the	law.	This	is	
in	line	with	UPOV	1991,	which	does	not	allow	
any	exceptions	to	the	eligibility	for	breeders’	
protection.	For	example,	it	does	not	allow	
provisions	that	may	disallow	the	granting	
of	breeders’	rights	where	the	public	order	or	
morality	may	be	adversely	affected	and	where	
there	are	reasonable	grounds	to	believe	that	
the	cultivation,	reproduction	or	any	other	
use	of	that	plant	variety	may	have	adverse	
environmental	impacts	and	so	forth.	It	is	a	
pity	that	the	Mozambique	PVP	law	has	taken	
such	a	permissive	approach	to	the	granting	of	
breeder’s	rights	and	is	slavishly	following	the	
prescriptions	of	UPOV	1991,	an	international	
regime	designed	by	and	for	developed	
countries.	Equity,	social	and	environmental	
justice	were	obviously	not	priorities	for	the	
Mozambican	government	when	drafting	their	
PVP	law.	
Information to be furnished by applicant 
hopelessly insufficient; no disclosure 
requirements
The	formalities	that	an	applicant	for	a	plant	
breeder’s	right	must	comply	with	are	set	
out	in	Article	13	of	the	PVP	law	including	
the	furnishing	of	certain	information	about	
the	applicant	and	the	proposed	name	and	
technical	description	of	the	variety.	In	addition,	
the	Registration	Entity	(defined	as	the	organ	
responsible	for	the	administration	of	plant	
breeders’	rights)	may	request	any	information,	
documentation	or	material	on	the	variety	as	
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may	be	required	for	the	purposes	of	conducting	
analyses	(Article	13(5)).	Nevertheless,	a	number	
of	critical	elements	are	missing	from	the	
provisions	of	Article	13.	
For	instance	the	Malaysian	2004	PVP	Act	
(Section	12)	requires	an	application	for	PBR	inter 
alia	to:
•	 Specify	the	method	by	which	the	plant	
variety	is	developed.	
•	 Be	supported	by	documents	and	information	
relating	to	the	characteristics	of	the	plant	
variety	that	distinguish	the	plant	variety	from	
other	plant	varieties.	
•	 Contain	information	relating	to	the	source	
of	the	genetic	material	or	the	immediate	
parental	lines	of	the	plant	variety.	
•	 Be	accompanied	with	the	prior	written	
consent	of	the	authority	representing	the	
local	community	or	the	indigenous	people	
in	cases	where	the	plant	variety	is	developed	
from	traditional	varieties.	
•	 Be	supported	by	documents	relating	to	the	
compliance	of	any	law	regulating	access	to	
genetic	or	biological	resources.	
•	 Be	supported	by	documents	relating	to	the	
compliance	of	any	law	regulating	activities	
involving	genetically	modified	organisms	in	
cases	where	the	development	of	the	plant	
variety	involves	genetic	modification.	
The	Indian	PVP	law	(Section	18)	requires	an	
application	for	PBR	protection	to	include:	
•	 An	affidavit	sworn	by	the	applicant	that	such	
variety	does	not	contain	any	gene	or	gene	
sequence	involving	terminator	technology.	
•	 Complete	passport	data	of	the	parental	lines	
from	which	the	variety	has	been	derived	
along	with	the	geographical	location	from	
where	the	genetic	material	has	been	taken	
and	all	such	information	relating	to	the	
contribution,	if	any,	of	any	farmer,	village	
community,	institution	or	organisation	in	
breeding,	evolving	or	developing	the	variety.	
•	 A	declaration	that	the	genetic	material	or	
parental	material	acquired	for	breeding,	
evolving	or	developing	the	variety	has	
been	lawfully	acquired.	These	elements	
are	important	to	safeguard	against	
misappropriation	of	genetic	resources	and	
associated	traditional	knowledge	and	to	
operationalise	benefit	sharing.	African	
governments	have	long	championed	in	
various	international	fora	such	as	the	World	
Intellectual	Property	Organization	(WIPO)	
and	the	WTO,	for	intellectual	property	
systems	to	incorporate	a	mandatory	
disclosure	of	origin	requirement	that	would	
include	proving	prior	informed	consent	and	
benefit	sharing.	
Requiring	full	disclosure	of	information	on	
how	the	variety	is	developed	in	exchange	for	
receiving	plant	variety	protection	is	also	critical	
to	transfer	technology	and	knowledge	to	the	
local	communities.	Moreover,	full	disclosure	of	
information	will	enable	Mozambique	to	ensure	
that	varieties	that	are	injurious	to	health	and	
the	environment	do	not	receive	protection.35	
It	should	be	noted	that	African	civil	society	
representatives	participated	in	a	regional	
workshop	to	review	the	draft	SADC	PVP	
Protocol	13-14th	March	2014,	in	Johannesburg	
South	Africa	when	the	other	workshop	
participants,	including	representatives	of	
SADC	member	states,	agreed	to	include	
in	the	Protocol,	as	part	of	the	application	
requirements	for	a	plant	breeder’s	rights,	a	
declaration	to	the	effect	that	the	genetic	
material	or	parental	material	acquired	for	
breeding,	evolving	or	developing	the	variety	
has	been	lawfully	acquired.
Publication of Information and pre-grant 
objections
Article	21	deals	with	the	publication	of	
information	in	the	Government	Gazette	at	
regular	intervals,	including	any	information	
of	public	interest.	It	would	be	important	
for	UNAC	to	request	that	public	interest	in	
this	context	be	defined,	at	least	to	include	
information	relating	to	the	disclosure	of	origin	
of	the	genetic	material	used	to	develop	the	
new	varieties	in	the	light	that	no	provision	on	
disclosure	of	origin	is	contained	in	the	PVP	law.	
In	terms	of	Article	21(2),	confidential	
information	included	in	the	application	for	
plant	breeders’	rights	shall	not	be	published	
without	the	consent	of	the	plant	breeder.	There	
is	really	no	good	reason	for	the	protection	of	
“information,”	which	is	much	wider	in	scope	
than	“confidential	business	information.”	
In	any	event,	the	Registration	Entity	should	
decide	what	confidential	business	information	
needs	protection	for	commercial	purposes	and	
what	information	should	be	put	in	the	public	
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domain.	As	the	law	is	currently	crafted,	the	
withholding	of	confidential	information	by	the	
applicant	trumps	the	public	interest.		
Article	22	obliges	the	Registration	Entity	to	
post,	in	either	the	Government	Gazette	or	a	
newspaper	of	widest	circulation	in	the	country,	
a	notice	of	every	application	received.	This	
notice	must	include	the	name	of	the	applicant,	
effective	date	of	the	application,	the	proposed	
designation	of	the	variety,	plus	any	information	
relating	to	the	application	that	may	be	needed	
to	describe	the	variety	for	purposes	of	public	
comment	or	that	may	be	detailed	in	the	
supplementary	norms	without	prejudice	to	the	
confidentiality	of	information	under	paragraph	
5	of	article	5	of	the	regulation.	
The	requirement	for	“information	relating	to	
the	application	which	may	be	necessary	to	
describe	the	variety	for	the	purposes	of	public	
comment”	is	too	vague	and	may	result	in	
arbitrary	decision-making	on	the	part	of	the	
Registration	Entity.	This	provision	should	be	
more	fully	defined	in	supplementary	norms	
to	include	information	that	the	public	may	
require	to	enable	meaningful	commentary	and	
participation	in	the	decision-making	process.	
Article	5(5)	provides	that	“The	Registration	
Entity	shall	determine	what	specific	
information	in	the	register	may	be	accessible	
to	the	public,	with	due	respect	for	the	
confidentiality	of	certain	information,	
particularly	that	which	pertains	to	company	
secrets”.	It	is	not	known	why	there	is	this	
discrepancy	between	Article	21(2)	and	Article	
5(5),	the	latter	which	attempts	to	signify	what	
kind	of	information	may	quality	as	confidential	
information,	namely	company	secrets.	Reading	
through	the	provisions	of	Article	22(2),	22(3)	and	
22(4),	it	becomes	immediately	apparent	that	
the	pre-grant	comment	procedure	is	aimed	
at	other	(perhaps	competing)	commercial	
breeders	who	are	constituted	as	organised	
entities	and	not	the	general	public.	
First,	Article	22(2)	refers	to	“any	entity”	as	
opposed	to	“any	person”	that	may	submit	a	
duly	substantiated	written	objection.	Second,	
the	written	objection	is	to	be	accompanied	
by	the	payment	of	fees.	Small-scale	farmers	
who	may	want	to	object	to	an	application	
will	be	hard	pressed	to	find	money	to	pay	fees	
or	may	be	discouraged	to	object	if	they	have	
to	pay	such	fees.	Moreover,	why	should	they	
if	it	is	their	democratic	right	to	participate	
in	decision-making	that	affects	their	or	the	
public’s	interest?	Third,	the	grounds	to	found	
any	objection	as	set	out	in	Article	22(4)(a)-( j)	
are	burdensome	to	small-scale	farmers	and	
not	focused	on	issues	that	they	engage	in.	
These	are	more	in	the	nature	of	grounds	that	
competitors	in	the	plant	breeding	industry	
would	be	interested	in.	Article	22(4)(k)	provides	
some	saving	grace	in	that	grounds	for	an	
objection	may	also	include	other	reasonable	
grounds,	to	accommodate	the	interest	of	
small-scale	farmers.		Where	an	objection	is	
lodged,	the	applicant	is	given	an	opportunity	
to	contest	the	objection.	The	final	decision	is	
made	by	the	Registration	Entity,	“having	heard	
the	parties	concerned	and	the	opinion	of	the	
Technical	Committee”.	It	appears	as	if	the	law	
contemplates	an	oral	hearing	that	the	decision	
of	the	Registration	Entity	not	be	a	unilateral	
one,	but	one	taken	after	soliciting	the	opinion	
of	the	Technical	Committee.	The	Technical	
Committee	is	established	by	the	Minister	of	
Agriculture	to	advise	the	Registration	Entity	on	
all	matters	relating	to	plant	breeders’	rights,	
consisting	of	a	plant	breeding	specialist,	a	
specialist	according	to	the	nature	of	the	issue	
and	a	jurist.	(Article	6(1)).	
Article	25	deals	with	the	granting	and	rejection	
of	plant	breeders’	rights,	which	is	obligatory	on	
the	Registration	Entity	where	the	application	
meets	the	NDUS	requirements,	the	application	
meets	with	the	requirements	of	the	law	with	
regard	to	designation	of	varieties,	and	where	
the	Registration	Entity	concludes	that	the	
objections	received	provide	no	grounds	for	
the	prevention	of	the	granting	of	the	plant	
breeders’	rights.	This	appears	to	imply	that	
despite	the	provisions	of	Article	7(2)	discussed	
above,	objections	may	well	stand	in	the	way	
of	the	grant	of	plant	breeders’	rights.	The	
only	concern	however,	is	that	the	provisions	
in	Article	25(3)	dealing	with	the	rejection	of	
an	application,	do	not	include	an	objection	
submitted	as	one	of	the	grounds	for	rejection.	
Chapter V Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Exclusive rights, exceptions and limitations
The	provisions	in	this	Chapter,	particularly	
Articles	27	and	28	deal	with	the	tensions	
between	the	granting	of	exclusive	intellectual	
property	rights	(IPRs)	to	a	breeder	to	exclude	
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all	third	parties	from	reproducing,	modifying	
or	distributing	the	plant	variety	in	respect	of	
which	the	IPRs	have	been	granted	in	order	to	
allow	the	breeder	to	recoup	its	investment	to	
create	the	subject	matter	of	the	intellectual	
property	(the	new	variety)	and	exceptions	to	
those	exclusive	rights	in	the	public	interest	or	
in	furtherance	of	social	and	policy	objectives.	
These	exceptions	appear	in	two	forms:	one	
that	permits	third	parties	to	engage	in	
specified	uses	of	protected	variety	without	the	
permission	of	the	right	holder	and	without	
remuneration	being	paid	to	the	right	holder.	
The	second	form	is	known	as	“compulsory	
licences”,	which	allow	third	parties	to	use	
the	plant	variety	without	the	right	holder’s	
consent,	but	only	upon	the	payment	of	
adequate	compensation.36	Compulsory	licences	
are	dealt	with	below.
These	provisions	in	Articles	27	and	28	also	
epitomise	the	stark	tensions	between	exclusive	
IPRs	granted	to	the	breeder	and	farmers’	rights.	
The	concept	of	farmers’	rights	was	developed	
to	reflect	the	contributions	that	traditional	
farmers,	particularly	in	the	developing	
world,	have	made	to	the	preservation	and	
improvement	of	plant	genetic	resources.	The	
Food	and	Agriculture	Organisation	Resolution	
5/89	defines	farmers’	rights	as	“rights	arising	
from	the	past,	present	and	future	contributions	
of	farmers	in	conserving,	improving	and	
making	available	plant	genetic	resources,	
particularly	in	centres	of	origin/diversity.”	37	
Such	rights	are	also	recognised	in	Article	9	of	
the	ITPGRFA,	to	which	Mozambique	is	not	a	
contracting	state.	
There	are	different	strands	to	farmers’	rights.	
These	include	providing	for	farmers’	rights	
as	exceptions	to	the	exclusive	rights	granted	
to	plant	breeders,	discussed	below.	A	second	
approach	is	develop	an	appropriate	sui generis 
law	in	order	to	permit	farmers	themselves	to	
claim	exclusive	rights	in	the	plant	varieties	they	
develop	within	their	own	breeding	systems,	
already	discussed	above.	A	third	approach	is	
to	recognise	farmers’	rights	through	benefit-
sharing	mechanisms	such	as	financial	
payments	and	technology	transfers,	which	
compensate	farmers	for	their	contributions	to	
plant	genetic	diversity.	
Article	27	sets	out	the	scope	of	the	exclusive	
nature	of	plant	breeders’	rights	and	Article	28	
deals	with	the	exceptions	to	plant	breeders’	
rights.	
Article	27	(1)	confers	exclusive	rights	to	plant	
breeders	to:
•	 Produce	and	multiply	propagating	material	
of	the	protected	variety
•	 Package	for	purposes	of	propagation	
•	 Sell,	market,	export,	import	and	store	the	
protected	variety.	
Anyone	who	wants	to	undertake	any	of	the	
above	activities	must	obtain	the	consent	of	
the	plant	breeder	in	the	form	of	a	licence	
granted	by	the	right	holder,	and	usually	upon	
payment	of	royalties.		Article	27(1)	is	to	some	
extent	modelled	on	Article	14(1)	of	UPOV	1991	
and	Article	29	of	the	draft	SADC	PVP	Protocol.	
Similar	provisions	are	also	to	be	found	in	
the	draft	ARIPO	PVP	Protocol,	but	there	are	
some	important	differences.	Article	27	of	the	
Mozambique	PVP	law	does	not	have	the	same	
controversial	and	draconian	Article	27(2)	that	
is	found	in	the	SADC	PVP,	which	extends	the	
exclusive	plant	breeders’	rights	to	harvested	
material	including	entire	parts	of	plants.	This	is	
at	least	a	saving	grace.	
Article	27(4)	also	extends	exclusive	rights	to	
varieties,	which	are	essentially	derived	from	the	
protected	variety,	where	the	protected	variety	
itself	is	not	an	essentially	derived	variety	and	
whose	production	requires	the	repeated	use	
of	the	protected	variety.	These	provisions	are	
consistent	with	the	provisions	of	Article	27(3)	
of	the	draft	SADC	PVP	and	Article	14(5)	of	UPOV	
1991.	
The	exceptions	to	the	plant	breeders’	rights	
as	set	out	in	Article	28	are	as	follows	(in	other	
words,	the	following	activities	are	allowed	
in	respect	of	the	protected	variety	without	a	
licence	having	to	be	issued	by	the	plant	breeder	
and	without	the	payment	of	royalties):
(a)	The	use	of	the	protected	variety	in	a	
programme	of	improvement	of	new	
varieties,	except	where	the	protected	variety	
is	repeatedly	used.
(b)	Experiments	or	research	activities.
(c)	Activities	carried	out	by	smallholders	for	
purposes	of	propagation	on	their	own	fields,	
and	the	product	of	the	cultivation	of	the	
protected	variety	in	their	own	fields.
(d)	Any	other	private	activity	carried	out	for	
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non-commercial	purposes.
Points	(c)	and	(d)	affect	small-scale	farmers	
directly.	But	what	do	these	exceptions	mean?	
Dealing	with	(c)	first:
Activities	carried	out	by	small-scale	farmers	for	
purposes of propagation on their own fields,	
and	the	product of the cultivation (harvest)	of	
the	protected	variety	on their own fields.
“Small-scale	farmers”	is	not	defined	and	is	a	
broad	concept	that	can	include	family	farmers,	
subsistence	farmers,	small-	scale	commercial	
farmers	and	so	forth.	
This	means	that	small-scale	farmers	are	only	
allowed	to	re-plant	farm	saved	seeds	of	the	
protected	variety	on	their	own	fields	and	to	
use	the	product	of	the	harvest	only	on	their	
own	fields.	Such	farmers	are	thus	not	allowed	
to	exchange,	barter,	or	sell	either	farm-saved	
seeds	of	the	protected	variety	or	to	share	the	
product	of	their	harvest	with	anyone	else	(for	
example,	family,	neighbours	or	the	community),	
except	to	use	this	on	their	own	fields.	Small-
scale	farmers	are	also	not	allowed	to	exchange,	
barter	or	sell	the	product	of	their	harvest	if	
it	derived	from	the	replanting	of	farm	saved	
seeds	of	a	protected	variety.	This	provision	is	
modelled	on	the	optional	exception	contained	
in	Article	15(2)	of	UPOV	1991.
Dealing	with	(d):
Any	other	private activity	carried	out	for	non-
commercial purposes.
This	is	identical	to	the	exception	provided	
in	Article	15(1)(i)	of	UPOV	1991.	According	to	
the	UPOV	guidance	document,	this	means	
that	“...	propagation	of	a	variety	by	a	farmer	
exclusively	for	the	production	of	a	food	crop	
to	be	consumed	entirely	by	that	farmer	and	
the	dependents	of	the	farmer	living	on	that	
holding,	may	be	considered	to	fall	within	the	
meaning	of	acts	done	privately	and	for	non-
commercial	purposes”.38	This	means	that	
even	consumption	by	the	farmer	and	his/her	
neighbour	or	community	would	not	fall	within	
the	exception.
What is wrong with these provisions? 
The	first	crucial	issue	is	that	the	exclusive	
rights	granted	to	the	breeder,	as	set	out	in	
Article	27,	in	conjunction	with	the	exceptions,	
prohibits	the	centuries-old	African	farmers’	
practice	of	freely	using,	exchanging	and	selling	
seeds/propagating	material.	These	practices	
underpin	90%	of	the	agricultural	systems	on	
the	African	continent.	Further,	these	provisions	
forbid	farmers	from	freely	exchanging	or	
selling	farm-saved	seed	and	propagating	
material	even	in	circumstances	where	breeders’	
interests	are	not	affected	(for	example,	in	
small	amounts	or	in	local	rural	trade).	Farmers	
wanting	to	engage	in	these	activities	would	
have	to	obtain	a	licence	from	the	breeder	and	
pay	royalties.	
Where	small-scale	farmers	buy	protected	
varieties	for	the	purposes	of	planting	for	
commercial	purposes,	these	provisions	
would	force	such	farmers	to	pay	a	second	
charge	on	something	they	already	possess.	
Implicit	in	these	provisions	is	the	mischievous	
objective	of	replacing	traditional	varieties	with	
uniform,	commercial	varieties	and	increasing	
the	dependency	of	small-scale	farmers	on	
commercial	seed	varieties.	This	system	aims	
to	compel	farmers	to	purchase	seeds	for	every	
planting	season	or	pay	royalties	to	the	breeder	
in	the	case	of	reusing	farm-saved	seeds.	In	
addition,	farmers	are	required	to	pay	for	
expensive	inputs,	such	as	fertiliser,	since	the	
performance	of	these	commercially	protected	
varieties	is	often	linked	to	such	inputs,	thereby	
creating	vicious	cycles	of	debt	and	dependence.	
Such	a	system	will	result	in	the	erosion	of	
crop	diversity	and	reduce	resilience	to	threats	
such	as	pests,	disease	and	climate	change.	It	
will	also	result	in	farmer	indebtedness	in	the	
face	of	unstable	incomes	(as	revenue	would	
vary	depending	on	seasons).	Additionally,	
these	commercial,	high-yielding	varieties	are	
very	likely	to	be	less	suited	to	the	specific	
agroecological	environments	in	which	farmers	
work	than	locally	adapted	traditional	farmer	
varieties.
Farmers	in	Africa	rely	heavily	on	seed	that	is	
saved	on	the	farm,	exchanged	with	family	
members	and	neighbours,	bartered	or	bought	
on	the	local	market.	This	reliance	on	these	
informal	seed	sources	is	independent	of	
whether	farmers	cultivate	local	or	modern	
varieties.	The	reasons	for	this	dependence	
include	inadequate	access	to	markets;	
unfavourable	market	channels	for	farmers	
living	in	remote	areas;	limited	access	to	
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financial	resources	or	credit	to	buy	seeds;	
the	inability	of	a	formal	system	to	provide	
timely	and	adequate	access	to	quality	seeds	
of	improved	varieties	and	to	varieties	that	are	
specifically	adapted	to	local	conditions.39
The	government	of	Mozambique	appears	
to	have	forsaken	its	small-scale	farmers.	It	
also	appears	to	have	forgotten	about	its	
international	obligations	under	the	Convention	
on	Biological	Diversity.	Article	10(c)	compels	
each	Party,	to	“protect	and	encourage	
customary	use	of	biological	resources	in	
accordance	with	traditional	cultural	practices	
that	are	compatible	with	conservation	or	
sustainable	use	requirements”.
The	government	of	Mozambique	has	turned	
its	back	on	the	African	Model	Law,40	which	
tries	to	balance	the	exclusive	rights	granted	
to	breeders	with	those	of	farmers’	rights.	
Article	30	of	the	African	Model	Law	grants	
the	right	holder	the	exclusive	right	to	sell	and	
produce	the	protected	variety.	The	rights	do	
not	extend	to	essentially	derived	varieties	or	
to	harvested	material.	Article	31	of	the	African	
Model	Law	deals	with	the	exceptions	to	the	
plant	breeders’	rights	and	allows	farmers	to	
propagate,	grow	and	use	plants	of	that	variety	
for	purposes	other	than	commerce:	use	of	the	
protected	variety	in	further	breeding,	research	
or	teaching	and	use	of	plants	or	propagating	
material	of	the	variety	as	an	initial	source	of	
variation	for	the	purpose	of	developing	another	
new	plant	variety,	except	where	the	person	
makes	repeated	use	of	plants	or	propagating	
material	of	the	first	mentioned	variety	for	the	
commercial	production	of	another	variety.
Farmers’	rights	under	Article	26	and	31	of	the	
African	Model	Law	include	the	right	to	use	
the	protected	varieties	to	develop	farmer	
varieties	and	to	save,	use,	multiply,	process	
and	exchange	farm-saved	seed	of	protected	
varieties.	The	farmers	may	also	sell	the	farm-
saved	seed/propagating	material	of	a	protected	
variety	provided	it	is	not	on	a	commercial	scale.
It	must	be	noted	that	the	African	civil	society	
representatives	who	participated	in	a	regional	
workshop	to	review	the	draft	SADC	PVP	
Protocol	13-14th	March	2014	in	Johannesburg	
were	able,	after	marathon	and	difficult	
discussions,	to	convince	the	stakeholders	
present,	including	SADC	member	state	
representatives,	to	revise	the	provisions	dealing	
with	exceptions	to	plant	breeders’	rights	in	
Article	28	of	the	draft	SADC	PVP	Protocol.	
Article	28(d)41	has	been	deleted	in	its	entirety	
and	a	new	clause	has	been	inserted	as	follows:	
“Acts done by a farmer to save, use, sow 
or resow, or exchange for non commercial 
purposes his or her farm produce including 
seed of a protected variety, within 
reasonable limits subject to safeguarding 
the legitimate interests of the holder of the 
breeder rights. The reasonable limits and 
the means of safeguarding of legitimate 
interests of the holder of the breeder rights 
shall be specified in the regulations made by 
the contracting parties.”
Chapter VI Compulsory licences
The	issue	of	a	compulsory	licence	is	another	
form	of	restricting	the	exclusive	rights	of	the	
plant	breeder.	Article	32	of	the	Mozambique	
PVP	law	does	provide	for	the	issue	of	a	
compulsory	licence	in	the	public	interest	or	
where	the	plant	breeder	unreasonably	refuses	
to	grant	the	licence	or	imposes	unacceptable	
conditions.	Since	“public	interest”	is	not	
defined,	it	is	not	known	whether	compulsory	
licences	will	be	issued	in	the	event	of	the	right	
holder	engaging	in	anti-competitive	behaviour.	
This	is	an	issue	that	may	become	very	relevant	
given	the	increasing	corporate	control	and	
consolidation	of	the	seed	industry	in	several	
countries,	including	in	South	Africa.	
It	is	recommended	that	UNAC	seek	revision	of	
this	Article	to	include	the	factors	as	set	out	in	
the	African	Model	Law.	These	factors	include	
instances	where	food	security	or	nutritional	or	
health	needs	are	adversely	affected;	where	a	
high	proportion	of	the	plant	variety	offered	for	
sale	is	imported;	where	the	requirements	of	the	
farming	community	for	propagating	material	
of	a	particular	variety	are	not	met;	where	it	
is	considered	to	promote	the	public	interest	
for	socioeconomic	reasons	and	for	developing	
indigenous	and	other	technologies;	and	any	
other	reason	that	the	government	may	deem	
necessary	in	the	public	interest,	in	situations	of	
emergency	or	to	alleviate	poverty.	
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Enforcement
Violations	of	the	plant	breeder’s	rights	
constitute	an	infringement	of	the	PVP	Law	
in	terms	of	Article	41.	In	terms	of	Article	42,	
infringement	obliges	the	Registration	Entity	
to	impose	penalties,	including	“necessary	
corrective	measures	including	warnings,	fines,	
temporary	or	permanent	suspension	and	
seizure	of	material”.	
It	is	questionable	whether	the	violation	of	
private	law	rights	should	result	in	an	organ	
of	state,	such	as	the	Registration	Entity,	
imposing	punitive	measures.	These	violations	
should	only	be	dealt	with	in	terms	of	civil	law	
remedies	and	in	terms	of	Article	42	of	the	PVP	
Law,	which	provides	that	any	“entity	violating	
plant	breeders’	rights	may	be	sued	by	the	right	
holder	in	a	competent	court	with	a	view	to	
prohibition	of	the	activity	and/or	compensation	
for	damages”.
Conclusion
We	strongly	recommend	that	UNAC	urgently	
seek	a	total	revision	of	Mozambique’s	PVP	
law	as	soon	as	possible.	The	right	of	farmers	
to	reuse	all	farmed-saved	seed	is	inviolable.	In	
this	regard,	the	wise	counsel	of	outgoing	UN	
Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Right	to	Food,	Olivier	
De	Schutter,	should	be	brought	to	the	attention	
of	the	government	of	Mozambique:	
“... reliance by farmers on farmers’ seed 
systems allows them to limit the cost of 
production by preserving a certain degree 
of independence from the commercial seed 
sector. The system of unfettered exchange in 
farmers’ seed systems ensures the free flow 
of genetic materials, thus contributing to the 
development of locally appropriate seeds 
and to the diversity of crops. In addition, 
these varieties are best suited to the difficult 
environments in which they live. They result 
in reasonably good yields without having 
to be combined with other inputs such as 
chemical fertilizers. And because they are 
not uniform, they may be more resilient 
to weather-related events or to attacks 
by pests or diseases. It is, therefore, in the 
interest of all, including professional plant 
breeders and seed companies which depend 
on the development of these plant resources 
for their own innovations, that these 
systems be supported.”42
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